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What is the nature of the right to strike for private sector employees in the 
United States? Much of the answer to this question can be traced to a case from 
70 years ago, National Labor Relations Bd. V. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. [1] 
This is an important inquiry because the number of strikes in the U.S. has been 
declining for several decades.  
Early in October 1935 in San Francisco, California, 60 employees at Mackay Radio 
went on strike. The company was in the business of transmitting telegraph and 
radio messages to and from centers in the U.S. and internationally. The purpose 
of the strike was to secure a collective bargaining agreement improving terms 
and conditions of employment. Negotiations at a national level had been taking 
place in New York over preceding weeks, but without an agreement being 
reached.  
The strike by local employees in San Francisco was one of several initiated by the 
union throughout the country, although the San Francisco action was the 
broadest in terms of participation. Within days, however, the tide was turning 
against the San Francisco workers. Strikers in other cities began returning to 
work, undermining the nationwide impact of the coordinated actions. The 
company also was bringing employees to San Francisco from its other locations. 
Sensing that the strikers would not prevail, and fearing that jobs would be lost to 
those brought in to do the work, some of the San Francisco employees met with 
management representatives to make arrangements for ending the strike.  
In the course of these return-to-work discussions, management prepared a list of 
11 prominent union activists that the company said should reapply as a condition 
for reinstatement. After several employees brought to San Francisco during the 
strike decided not to stay, six of the 11 union activists were put back to work. 
Five strikers were not reinstated. Instead, their jobs went to those the company 
brought to San Francisco during the strike.  
The union protested the company's refusal to rehire the five strikers by filing a 
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charge with the National Labor Relations Board, then a newly established agency 
with administrative oversight for the National Labor Relations Act, [2] a piece of 
New Deal labor legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in 1935. Under the NLRA, 
unions can be selected by employees to represent private sector workers in 
negotiations over wages, hours, and other terms of employment. Section 7 of the 
NLRA states that employees have the “right to self-organization, to form, join or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” [3] In U.S. labor law 
parlance, the phrase “concerted activities” is shorthand terminology for strikes 
and other organized pressure carried out by workers. [4] Interfering with a lawful 
strike is considered a violation of Section 7 and an unfair labor practice under the 
NLRA. [5]  
To clear up any doubt about the reach of protected concerted activity under 
Section 7, the NLRA has two additional provisions that reinforce the right to 
strike. In defining who is covered by the law, the NLRA states that the term 
“employee” includes, “any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence 
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute.” [6] To drive home this point, 
a catch-all provision underscores the right of employees to withhold their labor: 
“Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed 
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, 
or to affect the limitations of qualifications on that right.” [7] Viewed as a whole, 
the NLRA gives statutory approval to the idea that without protection to strike, 
workers are weaker when it comes to backing up demands in negotiations.  
With this statutory background, it is not surprising that the union prevailed on its 
charge to the NLRB, and that the U.S. Supreme Court eventually upheld the 
Board's decision three years later. Granted, there was no evidence that the 
company engaged in bad faith negotiations leading up to the strike, or that the 
company provoked the strike by other misconduct. However, the company's 
wrongdoing took place after negotiations and the strike itself, at the time it was 
asked to reinstate employees. At this stage of events, as recounted by the 
Supreme Court, there was ample evidence of the company's intent to 
discriminate against union activists. [8] In particular, there was evidence about 
statements by management agents telling the rejected workers that their union 
activities made them undesirable.  
Had the Supreme Court stopped with this observation about the company's 
discrimination against union adherents seeking reinstatement, no shadow would 
have been cast over the right of workers to strike, at least not at that point in 
time. However, the court went beyond its core holding that discrimination had 
been demonstrated, thereby opening the doors to employer counter-measures 
that, over time, have significantly altered the balance of power in U.S. labor 
relations. What did the court do to make this possible?  
While the court's decision affirmed the right to strike, it noted, almost in passing, 
that exercising the right to strike carries along with it the risk that employees can 
be replaced. Acknowledging that strikes are protected under the NLRA, the court 
said, “it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the 
statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying 
places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill 
the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, 
in order to create places for them.” [9]  
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In short, after Mackay Radio , workers can go on strike and keep their status as 
employees under the NLRA, but, at the same time, the employer has a right to 
keep the business going, and is free to hire permanent replacements who can 
keep their jobs even if strikers ask to return to work. In effect, employees can 
win their strike, but lose the chance to get their jobs back.  
Why did the court go beyond the narrow holding of discrimination appropriate for 
the case, and make a more sweeping declaration about an employer's right to 
keep a business going by hiring permanent replacements? Even in recognizing 
that employers could keep the business functioning, the court could have stopped 
short of its broad statement. For example, the court might have limited its 
comment to the prospect of hiring temporary replacements only until a strike is 
over, at least absent a showing that temporary replacements could not be found.  
Yet the court went further than was needed under the circumstances. Perhaps, 
since Mackay Radio was one of the first Supreme Court decisions dealing with a 
challenge to the NLRA, the court sought to reassure anxious employers that they 
were not powerless if they sought to do business in the face of strike activity. 
Perhaps, too, the court saw that the NLRB's advocates conceded in their brief to 
the court that employers could use economic forces at their disposal (that is, 
other workers looking for jobs), and that strikers are not guaranteed 
reinstatement under the NLRA. [10] In the court's decision, no explanation was 
provided to reconcile its remarks about using replacement workers with statutory 
language protecting the right to strike. Whatever the reason underlying the 
court's broad pronouncement, it has proved, over the years, a decided advantage 
for employers seeking to head off or defeat a strike.  
How does the apparent inconsistency in Mackay Radio work out in practice? As a 
preliminary point, it should be noted that the use of permanent replacements as 
leverage against strikers did not develop in full blown fashion until the last few 
decades, even though Mackay Radio was decided in 1938. In one notable 
example, President Reagan authorized the firing of thousands of striking air 
traffic controllers in 1981. Although this arose under a federal law for public 
employees, the action set the tone for the larger society.  
This approach is not without adverse consequences. Hiring replacements 
understandably angers striking workers and their supporters. This can prolong 
conflicts, making strike settlements more difficult to achieve because 
reinstatement becomes a major demand. Also, in industries with skilled workers, 
employers shy away from using replacements because they cannot easily step 
into the shoes of strikers. Hiring replacements has political implications, too, 
prompting legislative efforts in the U.S. Congress to prevent or limit their use, 
but these attempts have been unsuccessful.  
Still, with the percentage of the private sector unionized workforce plunging from 
about 35 percent in the early 1950s to about eight percent today, employers are 
less hesitant to invoke the prospect of hiring permanent replacements. Under the 
rules that have evolved after the Mackay Radio decision, those undertaking a 
strike for improved economic and working conditions, and who then seek to 
return to work, have no right to priority status to oust those who work at their 
old jobs, but only are reinstated when vacancies arise in the employer's 
workforce. [11]  
In contrast, if an employer's unfair practices caused the strike, or led to the 
strike being prolonged, the striking workers are entitled to immediate 
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reinstatement, with full back pay and benefits being paid, even if this outcome 
means that the replacement workers are terminated. [12] Unfortunately, it can 
take years of administrative and judicial scrutiny to determine whether 
employees engaging in a strike should be characterized as “economic” or “unfair 
labor practice” strikers. These characterization disputes can become major 
litigation battles because peoples' jobs and large amounts of employer liability 
often are at stake.  
In the final analysis, the lesson of Mackay Radio goes beyond the issue of striker 
reinstatement. It was the first of several Supreme Court decisions that, taken 
together, seriously weaken union power to undertake successful strikes in the 
face of determined employer opposition. A series of court decisions, for example, 
have allowed law suits for damages and injunctions when the union chooses to 
strike during the term of a collective bargaining agreement rather than use 
arbitration; [13] granted employers the right to head off a potential strike by 
taking the initiative and locking out workers from their jobs; [14] rejected union 
attempts to discipline employees who seek to resign as union members in order 
to return to work during a strike; [15] permitted replacement workers to sue 
employers after being let go as part of a settlement agreeing to striker 
reinstatement; [16] and, barred reinstatement of strikers for communications to 
the general public deemed to be too demeaning toward the employer. [17]  
For sure, there are some Supreme Court cases that protect striking employees 
from discriminatory employer conduct that is unduly punitive against strikers, 
such as in the Mackay Radio situation. [18] However, these decisions do not 
disturb the basic premise that an employer is free to continue the business while 
a strike takes place, and, indeed, can use counter-measures that provide 
weapons to defeat a strike, even before one has been called. A union that is 
unprepared to maintain broad solidarity in withholding labor has a narrow margin 
for error in its effort to prevail against an employer committed to defeat it.  
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